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Conservation Payments, Liquidity Constraints and Off-Farm Labor: 
Impact of the Grain for Green Program on Rural Households in China 
 
Abstract 
 
This study evaluates the off-farm labor response of rural households participating in the 
Grain for Green program in China, the largest conservation set-aside program in the developing 
world. Using a panel data set that we designed and implemented, we examine the impact of the 
program on changes in off-farm labor participation between 1999 (pre-program) and 2004 
(post-program) using a difference-in-differences approach and several extensions that account for 
program intensity. We also test whether the program impact is diverse depending on level of 
physical and human capital of participants.   
We find that on average the Grain for Green program has a positive effect on off-farm 
labor participation. Importantly, however, we find that program effects vary across groups of 
individuals in the sample. For example, we find that lower initial levels of wealth enhance the 
impact of the program on the off-farm employment activity. This result supports our view that 
the Grain for Green program may be relaxing liquidity constraints for the participating 
households and that is one reason why participants are more likely to find off-farm employment 
compared to non-participants.   
The positive impact of the conservation payments on off-farm labor is in stark contrast 
with the findings in the US where most studies have found that government payments to farmers 
decrease off-farm labor participation. One reason for the difference in findings between China 
and US may be because there are more impediments to participating in off-farm labor market in 
the poor areas of rural China (the areas in which the programs are being implemented) compared 
to the US and Grain for Green helps overcome these constraints. It could also be that there are 
differences in the age structure of the farming population between China (which is generally 
younger) and the US (which is generally older). This interpretation is reinforced by the finding 
that, while the average impact is positive, there is an even larger measured positive effect for the 
younger cohort. The measured effect of Grain for Green is negative for the older cohorts. We 
also find no impact on off-farm labor participation for individuals with low educational 
attainment (and positive for those with higher levels of education), suggesting that human capital 
is necessary when trying to achieve a structural change to earning activities. If policymakers 
want to achieve a win-win outcome through Grain for Green by meeting both the program’s 
environmental and development goals, they may need to provide extra support (for example, 
through greater assistance to education) to the vulnerable sub-populations in the program areas. 
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I. Introduction 
  In the past decade, an increasing number of incentive-based conservation programs have been 
launched in the economies of developing countries, including Costa Rica, Columbia, Mexico and China 
(e.g., Alix-Garcia, et al., 2003, Hyde, 2003, Pagiola, et al., 2002). Often called payments for 
environmental service (PES), incentive-based programs provide financial incentives to those who 
“supply” environmental services, including farmers who agree to set aside environmentally sensitive 
land or adopt farming technologies that generate environmental services such as conservation of wildlife 
habitat, sequestration of carbon and protection of watershed functions. 
  Since rural farmers often are suppliers of these environmental services, programs often have 
been designed with dual goals—to generate environmental services and to achieve economic 
development (Pagiola and Platais, 2005). A PES program can potentially increase the income of rural 
farmers directly and indirectly through compensation payments. For example, farmers who agree to set 
aside previously cultivated land for conservation purposes can increase their incomes if the payments 
they receive exceed the opportunity cost associated with retiring their land. In addition, farmers can use 
the compensation to finance other productive activities, both on and off the farm. Depending on the 
program design, these schemes can induce a reallocation of factor endowments and thus shift or 
diversify income-earning activities. PES programs can therefore indirectly induce fundamental structural 
changes in household income-earning activities. 
  The programs may be unsuccessful, however, if they cannot induce farmers to transform their 
income-generating activities. Payments are typically made for only a fixed term and can be terminated  
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early due to political disagreements and/or budget constraints. In the longer run, farmers often must shift 
their agricultural practices and income-generating activities so that they do not rely on program 
compensation payments. Otherwise farmers may become dependent on the incentive payments and upon 
their termination may have to return the land to cultivation to survive, undoing the long-term benefits of 
the program. 
  Despite the importance of understanding how farmers change their labor-allocation patterns in 
response to these programs, few studies to date have examined how PES schemes have or have not 
enabled farmers to optimally reallocate factor endowments and structurally change their 
income-generating activities. Many critical questions remain. For example, how does a conservation 
set-aside program induce farmers to shift labor allocations from on-farm production to off-farm work? 
What is the effect of such programs on on-farm labor allocation? Do program impacts depend on the 
endowment of the physical and human capital of the participants? 
  This study examines these questions by analyzing the largest PES experiment in the developing 
world: the Grain for Green program in China. Following a series of devastating floods in 1998, China’s 
government initiated a conservation set-aside program known as Grain for Green.
1  The program’s main 
objective is to increase forest cover on sloped cultivated land in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and 
Yellow River basins to prevent soil erosion. When such land is available in a community and the 
community is chosen to be part of the program, households can choose to set aside all or part of the 
cultivated land on such slopes and plant them with tree seedlings.
2  In return, the government 
compensates participants with in-kind grain, cash payments for two to eight years based on the type of  
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seedling planted and free seedlings in the initial year.
3  By the end of 2004, officials had expanded the 
program to some eight million hectares of cultivated land, involving approximately 15 million farmers 
in more than 2,000 counties in 25 provinces in China (State Environmental Protection Administration, 
2005, Xu, et al., 2006).   
  More than five years into the program, however, it is not yet clear how Grain for Green has 
affected how farmers allocate labor across income-generating activities. On one hand, the government 
explicitly states that poverty alleviation and restructuring of agricultural production into a more 
environmentally and economically sustainable set of activities are program goals (State Forestry 
Administration, 2003). Therefore, the government clearly has an expectation that the program will 
facilitate a shift in labor from low-profit grain production to production of more profitable crops and of 
livestock and, more importantly, from primarily on-farm work to greater off-farm work. On the other 
hand, off-farm activities, including self-employment and wage income, both in local job markets and in 
migrant labor markets, have been a driving force in reducing poverty in rural China (Bowlus and Sicular, 
2003, deBrauw, 2002, Meyer, et al., 1995 ). Given this recent trend, households in rural China may have 
been increasing their participation in off-farm activities even when they were not enrolled in the Grain 
for Green program. The results of empirical studies on the extent of the program’s labor impact are 
mixed: two studies of the Grain for Green program used data collected two years after the program 
began and found that the program had no impact on off-farm incomes or on off-farm labor participation 
(Uchida, et al., forthcoming, Xu, et al., 2004). A study involving data collected four years into the 
program found a positive effect on off-farm labor participation (Groom, et al., 2006).
4  
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  In fact, this study of the impact of Grain for Green on labor allocation in China is part of a 
wider set of studies examining the fundamental question of how government payments affect the 
off-farm-labor decisions of farmers, a subject of long-time interest to agricultural economists. During the 
past three decades, off-farm activities have provided a critical source of income to a majority of farm 
households in the U.S. and off-farm provision has been largely responsible for closing the gap in income 
between farm and nonfarm households (Ahearn, et al., 2005, Gardner, 1992, Mishra, et al., 2002).   
  Importantly, nearly all of the research conducted on U.S. farms has found that government 
payments to farmers, whether coupled or decoupled from decisions about production of a specific 
commodity, have decreased off-farm labor participation (El-Osta and Ahearn, 1996, Mishra and 
Goodwin, 1997). For example, Ahearn et al. (2005) found that payments from the Conservation Reserve 
Program decreased the likelihood of a farm operator working off the farm.
5  These findings suggest that 
the substitution effect, which would increase off-farm labor allocation, is outweighed by the income 
effect, which would decrease the number of hours allocated to off-farm labor. While these previous 
findings suggest a hypothesis that Grain for Green will lead to decreased off-farm participation, it is 
important to ask whether results from the U.S. can be expected to hold up for a developing economy. 
  In fact, there is reason to believe that the impact of conservation payments in a rural, 
developing economy may not follow the U.S. example and may have a positive effect on off-farm labor. 
Rural farmers in developing countries have much lower levels of income (and, as such, a higher 
marginal utility of income) than farmers in the U.S., so the negative income effect may be small enough 
that it is outweighed by the positive substitution effect. Moreover, household preprogram participation in  
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off-farm labor markets may be inhibited by low incomes (and the absence of liquidity to finance the shift 
into the off-farm market) as well as poorly functioning land and credit markets (Bardhan and Udry, 1999, 
Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Since land rental markets are frequently incomplete in rural China, most 
households cannot leave agriculture entirely (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). Furthermore, rural farmers in 
developing economies may be more likely to face high transaction costs and fixed/variable costs that 
prevent them from participating in off-farm labor, particularly for activities involving new 
self-employment or migration. To the extent that government payments can relax the liquidity 
constraints of rural farmers, incentive programs may help rural farmers obtain jobs off the farm and 
facilitate the structural transformation of households and the economies within which household 
members live and work. 
  The literature suggests that this conjecture may apply to rural China. A combination of high 
transaction costs, weak information-sharing and other regulations has been shown to restrict farmers in 
rural China from starting self-employment enterprises and seeking wage-earning jobs (deBrauw, 2002, 
Knight and Song, 2005). Although comprehensive investigations of credit markets in rural China have 
been rare, case studies suggest that, though formal and informal loans are available, borrowing remains 
severely constrained, especially for the resource-poor strata of the population (International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, 2001). Credit constraints have been shown to affect factor allocation in the 
production decisions of rural China’s households (Feder, et al., 1990). Given these conditions, if the 
Grain for Green program can increase liquidity for farmers, the program may enable them to find jobs 
off the farm and increase other productive activities.  
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  In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the Grain for Green program and the data used in 
this study. Section 3 develops the household model that illustrates how a PES may affect a household’s 
decisions about how to allocate land and labor across different activities when faced with a liquidity 
constraint. Section 4 gives an overview of the study’s empirical approach and discusses the 
identification strategy. Section 5 is devoted to estimation of the effect of China’s Grain for Green 
program on the off-farm-labor participation of rural households, and Section 6 provides estimates of the 
effects of the program for various groups, dividing the sample according to levels of physical and human 
capital endowment. Section 7 concludes and summarizes the results.   
 
II. The Grain for Green Program and Study Data 
China’s Grain for Green Program 
  Starting in 1999 as a pilot program, the Grain for Green program was implemented by China’s 
government as a crop land set-aside program to increase forest cover and prevent soil erosion on 
cultivated slopes.
6  By 2010, the State Forest Administration plans to convert 15 million hectares of crop 
land (approximately 10 percent of all of China’s cultivated area) (State Forestry Administration, 2003).
7 
Since the main objective of China’s program is to restore the nation’s forests and grasslands to prevent 
soil erosion, program designers have set slope as one of the main criteria by which plots are selected for 
inclusion in the Grain for Green program. 
  According to the program’s rules, each participating farmer receives three types of 
compensation: in-kind grain, cash and free seedlings. In-kind grain and cash compensation are given out  
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annually in response to the farm passing an inspection; seedlings are provided only in the first year. The 
program is designed so that there are only two levels of compensation nationwide, which reflect inherent 
differences in regional average yields. The compensation level is 1,500 kilograms per hectare per year in 
the Yellow River basin and 2,250 kilograms per hectare per year in the Yangtze River basin. In 
cash-equivalent terms, the sum of the three types of compensation given to farmers in the upper and 
middle reaches of the Yellow River basin amounts to 3,150 yuan per hectare during the first year of 
conversion and 2,400 yuan per year per hectare in following years.
8  For the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze River, the program pays farmers 4,200 yuan per hectare in the first year and 3,450 yuan per year 
per hectare thereafter. 
  While preventing soil erosion is Grain for Green’s primary objective, poverty alleviation is 
another stated goal (State Forestry Administration, 2003). According to interviews that we have 
conducted over the past several years, many local governments consider access to the nation’s Grain for 
Green program as an opportunity to promote transformation of their counties’ local economic structures. 
A survey of investment projects between 1998 and 2003 in 2,459 sample villages across six provinces in 
China showed that the Grain for Green program was the third most common project being implemented 
after road, bridge and irrigation projects (Zhang et al. forthcoming).   
  The program can potentially affect household wealth, both directly and indirectly. Grain for 
Green directly affects household incomes through the grain and cash compensation, which can be used 
for other productive activities and for consumption. How much compensation influences wealth depends 
on the level of that compensation relative to a household’s opportunity cost. Previous studies of the  
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Grain for Green program have found that the compensation rate typically is larger than the value of the 
crop yielded by the retired plots (i.e., the opportunity cost of program participation) (Xu et al., 2006; 
Uchida et al., 2004).
9  The conservation set-aside program also can indirectly induce structural change in 
household wealth by reducing the demand for labor for cultivating crops. How the freed-up labor time 
gets reallocated critically depends on the other physical resources possessed by the household, the 
household’s stock of human capital and preferences for utility for leisure. Postprogram resource 
allocation also is influenced by the nature of labor and credit markets. In addition, the ultimate use to 
which a participating family’s freed-up labor is reallocated can be expected to interact with the amount 
of physical capital available to the household. Farmers could invest the compensation that they receive 
into investments or activities that will aid them in switching from cultivating crops to other productive 
activities, particularly off-farm endeavors. The costs associated with migration—and with funding the 
investment needed to start a family-owned business—can be high for households living in poor, 
mountainous areas. Farmers also may use the compensation to invest in higher-value crops and livestock 
enterprises. 
Data 
  We use a panel data set from household surveys that we designed and implemented in 2003 and 
2005. The surveys were commissioned by China’s State Forest Administration as part of its effort to 
evaluate the Grain for Grain program at the end of its third year of implementation. This data set is 
believed to be the only existing panel data set that includes both participating and nonparticipating 
households. The descriptive statistics for the key variables discussed here are shown in Table 1.    
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  The 2003 household survey used a stratified sampling strategy designed to collect data on a 
random sample of 359 households in the program area. From the three provinces (Sichuan, Shaanxi and 
Gansu) that had been participating in Grain for Green since 2000, we selected two counties from each 
province and then randomly selected three townships from each county. In each township, we randomly 
selected two participating villages and randomly chose ten households from each village. The data 
includes information on at least one program-participating household for each village. Two of the 36 
villages had only participating households. The survey in 2003 collected information on 2002 and 1999. 
The survey in 2005 was nearly identical to the earlier wave and included 348 households. Of the 359 
households surveyed in 2003, we were able to track 270 of them in 2005, 230 of which were 
participating households. Of the 230 households, 27 had entered the program since 2003. The attrition 
rate (from the survey) was 24 percent for households participating in the program and 32 percent for 
nonparticipating households. The households not included in the 2005 survey were not systematically 
different from households that were included in both surveys and were dropped from further analysis.
10 
Among the program participants, there is variability in the number of years that they 
participated; the extent of their participation (in terms of absolute cultivated area and share of the 
household’s cultivated area) varied widely across the sample (Figures 1 and 2). A third of the households 
in the sample started to participate during the initial year of the program (Figure 1). The share of land 
that each household retired from cultivation also varied among participating households and ranged 
from less than 5 percent of total cultivated land holdings to 100 percent (Figure 2). When considering 
program impacts, it is reasonable to expect that the effect of the program will vary depending on how  
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much of a farm is part of the program and how long the land has been retired. Hereafter, we use these 
two variables as measures of the intensity of program participation and as tools for identifying the 
effects of the program. 
  Combining the 2003 and 2005 surveys provides information on nearly all of the same variables 
for both before (in 1999) and after (in 2002 and 2004) implementation of Grain for Green. Enumerators 
collected information on each household’s production activities on a plot-by-plot basis. The survey also 
collected detailed information on each household’s total asset holdings, its demographic make-up and 
other income-earning activities involving both on-farm and off-farm activities. 
  The study relies on information for 1999 that was collected in 2003, and we acknowledge the 
potential for problems inherent in recall data, especially regarding the preprogram period. Long-term 
recall data are potentially inaccurate, although this issue continues to be debated in the literature. 
Unfortunately, the Chinese government’s quick decision to implement Grain for Green and lack of 
transparency in the details of its implementation precluded interviews with potential participants at the 
program’s onset. We addressed concerns about recall bias through the design of the survey and careful 
training and monitoring of the enumerators to ensure that respondents gave their best recollection of past 
amounts and activities. We also endeavor to deal with the recall bias by reestimating all of the analyses 
using a sample of only 67 households—the 27 households that switched from nonparticipant to 
participant status between the two surveys and the 40 nonparticipating households. With this subsample, 
we can compare the changes in off-farm labor between 2002 and 2005 to avoid having to rely on the  
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recall data for 1999. If the results from the analysis using the subsample of households are consistent the 
results from the analysis using the full sample, it would suggest that that recall bias is limited.   
Off-farm labor allocation 
  By 2004, a large share of participating household members has reallocated their time to 
off-farm work (Figure 3). In the 2005 survey, enumerators asked each respondent what the participating 
household did with the time that was freed up after implementation of the program. According to 
tabulations of the data, the largest share of respondents replied that they had reallocated the time of 
household members to off-farm work (32 percent). The second most frequent response was that 
households had allocated more labor to their remaining cultivated land (29 percent). In addition, 
respondents stated that they had invested this freed labor time in leisure time (or time spent at home—11 
percent) and (in conjunction with the in-kind grain compensation) to increase the scope of their livestock 
enterprises (9 percent).   
  Descriptive statistics from the household data showed that off-farm labor allocation was 
increasing for both participating and nonparticipating households (Figure 4, Panel A). From 1999 
through 2004, individuals with off-farm jobs increased 13 percent for participating households and 8 
percent for nonparticipating households. Because off farm employment is changing for both types of 
households, it is clear that in order to evaluate convincingly the impact of the program on off-farm labor, 
we need to control for the time effect and thus cannot simply compare postprogram levels of off-farm 
work between the two groups. Among the individuals that had off-farm employment in 2002, we find 
that 42 percent had jobs that were not local (implying that they were part of the migrant labor force and  
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both lived and worked away from home). Forty percent of individuals with off-farm employment had 
local wage-earning jobs and 18 percent were self-employed. The costs associated with migration and the 
investment funds needed to start a family-owned business can be high. The high costs that would be 
associated with shifting a family’s labor allocation from on-farm to off-farm jobs (or between farm 
enterprises) are why we assume that poor farmers may face a liquidity constraint in the conceptual 
model.
11 
  While there was a detectable increase in off-farm employment participation for both program 
participants and nonparticipants, the same cannot be said for on-farm work (Figure 4, Panel B). 
Individuals who engaged in farming activities (for at least some part of the year) increased by 6 percent 
among nonparticipants but decreased by 4 percent among participants. The reason why on-farm labor 
did not decrease as much as the increase in off-farm activities may be because off-farm jobs frequently 
did not provide full-time work and individuals consequently returned to farm work periodically.   
 
III. Conservation Set-Aside and Labor Allocation Decisions:   
A Conceptual Framework 
  Given the interactions between factors that influence how a conservation set-aside program 
affects a farmer’s time allocation, we construct a conceptual model to understand how land and labor 
allocations are interlinked with liquidity and other constraints that a farmer might face. We extend the 
literature on off-farm labor allocation in a household production framework by including liquidity and  
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land constraints as well as the choice to allocate land to the conservation set-aside program. Here we 
provide a sketch of the model; the full model is described in Appendix 1. 
We consider a farm household that maximizes utility, which is defined by consumption of 
leisure and a composite consumption good. In maximizing its utility, the household faces four 
constraints: a time constraint, a land constraint, a liquidity constraint and a full income constraint. First, 
the household’s time endowment is divided among working on-farm, working off-farm in a 
wage-earning activity and leisure. To work off the farm, the household incurs variable transaction costs 
(e.g., transportation costs) and fixed transaction costs (e.g., job-search costs or start-up costs for a 
family-owned business). Second, the household’s land endowment is divided among cultivated land that 
can be used for agricultural production and the conservation set-aside program. The government 
compensates the household for program participation at a fixed rate per unit of land. We assume that the 
land and labor required to produce the agricultural good on-farm are complements. Third, the household 
is endowed with a certain amount of liquidity. Expenditures on nonlabor input for farm production plus 
the (variable) transaction costs that a household faces when it wants to participate in off-farm work are 
limited to the sum of the value of the household’s liquidity, which is the sum of its liquid asset, the 
amount borrowed and the compensation from land retirement. Households may have to seek credit to 
finance farm production or to work off-farm. If a household chooses to borrow an amount B, it incurs a 
fixed transaction cost, representing time and monetary costs of the loan application and disbursement. 
Finally, the full income constraint limits consumption to income from off-farm labor, profits from  
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production of agricultural commodities, compensation from the set-aside program and liquid asset minus 
any fixed transaction costs that are made when participating in off-farm labor and/or credit markets. 
  In this stylized model, the Grain for Green program can affect labor allocation in three ways. 
First, the program can relax the liquidity constraint through its compensation, 
gfg A d . When the liquidity 
constraint is relaxed, the shadow value of liquidity, 
B l , decreases. The household will allocate less 
labor to farm production and more to off-farm activities, ceteris paribus (through the substitution effect). 
Moreover, without a well-functioning land rental market, allocating land to a conservation set-aside 
program will reduce the land allocated to farm production. By assumption, labor and land are 
complements, so decreasing the amount of land allocated to farm production also decreases on-farm 
labor. As a consequence, households have freed-up time to allocate to either productive labor uses or 
leisure (also the substitution effect). Finally, if compensation from the set-aside program can relax the 
liquidity constraint, the household may be able to either afford the transaction costs associated with 
obtaining credit and/or earn additional income through off-farm labor and on-farm activities, potentially 
garnering a higher income because of participation in the program. If so, the household can allocate time 
to leisure, which would reduce the time devoted to on-farm and/or off-farm labor (income effect). 
Whether the net impact is positive is an empirical question. In the following section, we will explain the 
identification strategy to test these hypotheses. 
  Assuming that the income effect is small in the poor regions where the program is implemented, 
we derive the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 1: If an agent’s liquidity constraint is relaxed through program payments, then an agent 
allocates more time to off-farm labor and less to on-farm labor. 
Hypothesis 2: The more liquidity-constrained a household’s is prior to the program, the larger the effect 
of program payments on off-farm labor.   
 
IV. Identification Strategy 
  Based on the conceptual model and its assumptions, the reduced form of the off-farm 
labor-supply equation for a liquidity-constrained household is given by 
( )
* ; , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
gfg vo o B c f o
o L f A p w K B A L z z z w d t t t =    
where    is off-farm labor,    is land allocated to Grain for Green;    are the output price, 
wage and agricultural input prices, respectively;    is a compensation rate per area unit for the 
conservation set-aside program; K and B are liquid assets and the amount that was borrowed, 
respectively;    are the household’s endowment of land and labor;    represent variable and 
fixed transaction costs for off-farm work and borrowing; and    represent a household’s 
consumption preferences, exogenous conditions on farming productivity and a household’s human 
capital.   
If the Grain for Green program were truly a randomized experiment in which participants were 
randomly chosen from the targeted population, we would have an ideal statistical basis on which we 
could use postprogram data for participants and nonparticipants to estimate 
* gfg
o L A m a e = + +     
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and obtain an unbiased program impact of  a . However, the participants in the Grain for Green program 
were not randomly chosen. In the absence of truly randomized experimental program, the coefficient  a  
may be contaminated by other unobserved factors that could affect a household’s off-farm labor-supply 
decisions. Simple comparisons of preprogram and postprogram outcomes for the participants also may 
be biased due to temporal trends in off-farm labor markets and/or by the effects of events other than the 
Grain for Green program that occurred between the two periods (and affected each household’s off farm 
employment). Systematic differences could arise, for example, because households were selected for the 
program based on unmeasured household or village characteristics or because earning levels differed 
among different segments of the labor markets in which the participating and nonparticipating 
households function. In essence, these are all components of the selection bias that is inherent in data 
from nonrandomized programs. 
  The descriptive statistics underscore the bias that can arise if we estimate the program impact 
by a simple regression that uses only data from participating households or only data from the 
postprogram period. Although the number of participating households that reported off-farm work 
increased between 1999 and 2004, off-farm employment rates for nonparticipating households also 
increased. One or more factors, such as deepening of the local off-farm labor markets in regions that 
host the Grain for Green program, could contribute to households shifting labor to the off-farm 
employment market. Hence, to obtain the least biased estimate of the impact of the Grain for Green 
program, we hold constant other observable and unobservable time-variant and time-invariant effects as 
much as possible.  
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  To address this concern, we use data from nonparticipating households to identify variations in 
the outcome variables of interest (e.g., off-farm labor-market participation) that are due to factors other 
than the Grain for Green program. The data from both participating and nonparticipating households are 
used in a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator that analyzes these types of program effects with 
these types of data. In fact, DID has been used extensively in the labor economics literature to assess the 
employment effects of a number of different government policies, including the impact on employment 
of a raise in the minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1994) and the effects of temporary disability 
benefits on the duration of time off from work after an injury (Meyer, et al., 1995 ).   
  In short, DID compares outcomes from a policy change on two groups—those affected by the 
policy change (program participants) versus those who are not (non-participants of the program -- Meyer, 
1995). Formally, DID can be shown by letting  t  and  t¢  denote time periods after and before the 
program, respectively. The DID estimate is given by 
[ ] [ ] ( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 0) ( | 0) t t t t DID E Y D E Y D E Y D E Y D ¢ ¢ = = - = - = - = . 
The idea is to correct the simple difference between an outcome before the policy change and after for 
the treatment group by comparing the before-after change of treated units with the before-after change 
of control units. By doing so, any common trends that show up in the outcomes of the control units and 
of the treated units are differenced out (Smith, 2004). The estimator also can eliminate recall bias 
inherent in a retrospective survey to the extent that the bias is the same for the two groups. 
  Use of the DID estimator, however, depends on several key assumptions. The conventional DID 
estimator requires that, in the absence of the program, average outcomes for participants and  
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nonparticipants follow parallel trends over time. In other words, it assumes that the coefficients 
associated with  t Y¢  (the preprogram outcome) and the covariates in  t¢  (the preprogram period) equal 
one. This assumption may be implausible if unobservable preprogram characteristics are thought to be 
associated with the dynamics of the outcome variable and the characteristics are different for 
participating and nonparticipating groups. We also report DID estimates of the impact of Grain for 
Green on off-farm employment (and other outcome variables) for models that include the preprogram 
outcome ( t Y¢) and other preprogram control variables (such as household size and total land holdings) 
that can increase the probability that the parallel trend assumptions hold. 
  Employing DID allows us to control for a number of variables in the reduced form of the 
model.
12  First, DID differences out all the time-invariant variables. We assume that the total land and 
time endowment  ( ) , A L , the variable and fixed transaction costs for participation in off-farm-labor and 
credit markets  ( ) , ,
vo o B t t t   and the household characteristics that determine consumption and 
production  ( ) , ,
c f o z z z   are time-invariant.
13  Next, DID zeroes out any time-variant variables for which 
the two groups change in parallel (i.e., variables that have common trends). We assume that changes in 
input and output prices  ( ) , , p w w   are common to all households, so these effects are captured. 
  After controlling for time-invariant factors and for time-variant factors that have common 
trends, we are left with time-varying observable and unobservable factors for the two groups that affect 
changes in off-farm labor participation and that systematically change along nonparallel trends. Among 
them, we are able to control for the program compensation rate  ( ) d , which varies over time. It equals 
zero for all households in 1999 and has a positive value only for participating households in 2004. There  
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are two rates of compensation set for the entire sample: a higher level for samples in Sichuan Province, 
which is located in the Yangtze River basin, and a lower one for households in Gansu and Shaanxi 
Provinces, which are located in the Yellow River basin. We therefore include an interaction term 
between a dummy variable for the Yangtze River basin rate and a year dummy variable for 2004.   
  Given the preceding considerations, we estimate the empirical model as 
        (1) 
where t indicates time, which equals zero for the preprogram period and one for the postprogram period. 
The coefficient  a   (from the DID estimator) is the parameter of interest. Because we have both 
household and individual data, we estimate equation (1) at both the household and the individual level. 
Since errors in the equation that uses individual data may be correlated within households, we report 
model results that account for clustered errors at the household level. We also extend the DID 
framework to test whether the intensity of participation in the program influences the program effect by 
replacing the treatment variable  ( , ) D i t   with measures of intensity. 
Strategy to Estimate How Liquid Assets Affect the Program’s Impact on Off-Farm Labor 
  Two of our variables that can be used as measures of liquidity  ( ) , K B   also depict different 
trends between the participating and nonparticipating groups. Since we are specifically interested in 
whether the program’s effect on labor allocation differs for households with different levels of liquidity, 
we turn now to the strategy for testing this.
14  Ideally, if we could directly classify households into those 
that are liquidity-constrained and those that are not (e.g., Carter and Olinto, 2003), we could estimate the 
program’s impact for each group and test whether there are statistically detectable differences between  
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the two groups. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information on credit and loan application 
history from the surveys to do this.   
  Consequently, we take two alternative approaches. We first calculate the preprogram value of 
each household’s liquid assets  ( ) S . We assume that liquid assets include the value of livestock assets, 
fixed productive assets and consumable durable goods, plus loans and deposits. We then divide the 
sample households into quartiles based on the value of their total liquid asset:  , [1,2,3,4] j Q j =   where j 
= 1 is the group of households with the lowest asset value. We then test whether the program effects 
differ among the quartiles using the DID framework. Heterogeneity in treatment effects can be studied 
by including interactions between  j Q   and the treatment dummy variable. Thus, we estimate the 
following equation: 
. (2) 
If a household’s liquidity constraint is indeed being relaxed by participation in the Grain for Green 
program, there will be a positive impact by the program on participation in the off-farm labor market (or 
on earnings from agriculture). In the empirical model, we anticipate that households that had a lower 
level of liquidity before Grain for Green (those households belonging to the lower two quartiles) will 
see a greater relaxing of their liquidity constraint when they receive their compensation than households 
that had owned a set of liquid assets with a higher value (or those from the top two quartiles).   
  As a second alternative approach, we utilize a rule developed by Zeldes (1989) to split the 
households into liquidity-constrained and -unconstrained groups. Specifically, Zeldes classifies 
households into the liquidity-constrained group if their estimated non-housing wealth was less than two  
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months’ worth of income. We split our sample households using this criterion, estimate DID for each 
group and test whether or not those estimates are statistically significantly different between groups.   
 
V. Effect of the Grain for Green Program on Off-Farm Labor 
Basic Difference-in-Differences Results 
  Point estimates from the DID model reveal that the Grain for Green program increased off-farm 
labor participation and decreased on-farm labor participation (Tables 3 through 6, column 1 in all tables). 
Off-farm labor participation increased for both participants and nonparticipants, but it increased more 
for participating households. A household that participates in Grain for Green increases its off-farm 
labor by an average of 0.3 persons (Table 3, column 1).
15  Intuitively, the size of the estimate implies that 
one adult in one out of every three households that participate in the program enters the off-farm 
employment market after the program is implemented. This estimate is not statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. At the individual level, however, participating in the program increases the likelihood 
of an individual person working off-farm by 15 percent, an estimate that is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level (Table 5, column 1). 
  Similarly, participation in the Grain for Green program decreases the number of adults working 
on-farm (Table 4, column 1). The program decreases participation in on-farm work by an average of 
0.43 persons and this estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Intuitively, this means that 
an adult in nearly one out of two participating households stops working on-farm. In the model that uses  
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individual data, participation in the program decreases the likelihood of an individual working on-farm 
by 13 percent, although the point estimate is not significant (Table 6, column 1). 
  For those that expect that Grain for Green will help to promote off-farm employment, the 
results of the basic regression are somewhat encouraging. The signs of the basic DID estimates suggest 
that Grain for Green is promoting structural change, although the low t-ratios on some of the estimates 
suggest weak confidence in the results. In addition, the nature of the results differs for estimates that use 
household-level data and those that use individual-level data.   
Effect of Program Intensity 
  While the positive results from the program-participation models are relatively weak, the results 
for estimates of the effect of program intensity are somewhat stronger. To exploit the variation in 
treatment intensity across households, the DID strategy can be generalized. Consider the difference 
between average off-farm labor participation for Grain for Green participants versus nonparticipants. If 
devoting more land to the program led to an increase in available labor time or an increase in liquidity 
that households could use to find off-farm jobs, the difference in off-farm labor could be positively 
related to the area of land retired by each household. This suggests the following regression: 
 
where  ( , ) P i t   denotes the intensity of the program for observation i in year t.  ( , ) P i t   is zero for all 
observations in year 1999 and positive only for participants in year 2004. As before, all specifications 
control for the interaction term for the Yangtze River basin dummy variable times the year 2004 dummy 
variable and for household size and total land holdings. In the model, we include (1) the ratio of program  
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area to total land holdings, (2) the number of years in the program, and (3) an interaction term between 
the ratio of retired to total land area and the duration of the program. 
  The results in most specifications of the model reveal that greater intensity of program 
participation increases off-farm labor participation (Table 3, columns 2–6). Specifically, a larger retired 
land area and a higher ratio of retired land to total holdings lead to an increase in off-farm labor 
participation. The results imply that a household composed of five adults that retires an additional 10 mu 
of its cultivated land to the Grain for Green program will increase off-farm work by 0.5 persons (0.01 ´ 
10 ´ 5) (column 2). Likewise, when a household of five adults allocates 40 percent more of its cultivated 
area to the program, the household will increase off-farm work by 0.5 persons (0.284 ´ 0.4 ´ 5—column 
3). In the sample, the average number of adults per household is four. Duration in the program, by itself, 
is not associated with greater off-farm labor participation (column 4), but when the program area and 
duration are jointly considered, the longer a household has been in the program, the greater its increases 
in off-farm labor participation (columns 5–6). 
  At the individual level, only the ratio of program area to total land holdings is associated with a 
greater propensity to work off-farm (Table 5, columns 2–6). These results suggest that a household (that 
the individual belongs to) retires all of its cultivated land will increase the likelihood of an adult member 
working off-farm by nearly 10 percent (column 3).   
  Interestingly, we find that program intensity matters for changes in off-farm labor participation 
but not for changes in work on the farm regardless of whether the data is at the household or individual 
level (Tables 4 and 6, columns 2–6). This result may be driven by the binary nature of the measure of  
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off-farm work; with a binary variable, we cannot capture changes in time spent on-farm (measured in 
days or hours). Since most households (and individuals) in the sample continue to farm while 
participating in the program (even when they get local jobs off-farm), we find no statistical effect of 
participation in Grain for Green on on-farm labor. 
Assessing Selection Bias 
  Since we are concerned that the preprogram variables for 1999 may suffer from recall bias, we 
repeat all of the preceding analyses on the smaller subset of households (n = 27) that changed status 
from nonparticipant to participant between 2002 and 2004. In that analysis, we use the same 40 
nonparticipating households as the control group. With this subset, while the sample is smaller, the data 
are true panel data and are not subject to errors due to recall. 
  Overall, the findings from the smaller subset are consistent with those from the full sample 
(Appendix Tables 1 and 2). The Appendix tables provide the results of the program’s effect on off-farm 
labor participation at the individual level. The DID estimates for the subset are slightly larger than the 
estimates for the full sample. This consistency between samples suggests that recall bias in 1999 was 
limited and/or that the DID approach controlled for bias that existed in both groups. 
Discussion 
  In summary, the DID estimates of the binary indicator for program participation and the 
variables for program intensity suggest that the Grain for Green program led to something between a 
small and moderate increase in off-farm work among participating households. This finding is in sharp 
contrast to two prior studies of the Grain for Green program that found no effect on off-farm labor  
 
25 
participation or on income from off-farm work (Xu, et al., 2005; Uchida, et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
since both of those studies used household surveys that collected information on labor-allocation 
decisions only for the first three years of the program, it may have been too soon for changes to be 
detected. In this study, we use data collected five years after the program began, which may have 
allowed sufficient time for participating households to begin to find off-farm employment in numbers 
that are statistically detectable. 
  The positive impact of the program on off-farm labor also is in stark contrast to findings from 
studies of the impact of government farm payment programs in the U.S. Previous U.S. studies of 
government payments to farmers, including the Conservation Reserve Program, have consistently found 
that government payments negatively affect household off-farm employment participation (e.g., Ahearn, 
et al., 2005). The results in China may move in the opposite direction for several reasons. The higher 
level of income of U.S. farmers compared to what is typical for farmers in the Grain for Green program 
in China probably is the most likely reason why farmers in the U.S. do not choose to work off-farm 
when offered a government payment (i.e., the wealth effect dominates). In short, the income effect of 
leisure may dominate for richer U.S. farmers while the substitute effect may dominate for poor farmers 
in China. We also believe that the divergent program effects stem from underlying conditions in the two 
labor and credit markets. Although labor and credit markets exist in rural China, transaction costs may 
be high enough that households face much larger constraints in accessing them. According to our results, 
it appears that Grain for Green is helping to alleviate the liquidity constraints. 
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VI. Heterogeneous Program Effect on Off-Farm Labor 
  In the previous section, we found—with at least some degree of confidence—that the Grain for 
Green program has led to an increase in off-farm labor participation. The DID estimates, however, do 
not allow us to understand how the program affects off-farm labor or which types of farmers are 
participating. In fact, we are interested in understanding how these changes occur. In particular, based on 
the stylized conceptual model, we want to understand the role of two factors when households make 
off-farm labor-participation decisions: physical capital and human capital. In this section, we test 
whether the program has heterogeneous effects on off-farm labor that depend on the availability of 
physical and human capital to the households before the program. To do so, we estimate equation (2). 
Liquidity Constraint 
  We find that the effect of the program on off-farm labor is clearly larger for households that had 
less liquid assets prior to the program (Table 7, columns 1 and 3). For households belonging to the 
quartile of households with the lowest level of assets, the program increased off-farm work by an 
average of 0.52 persons (column 1). Intuitively, this means that one adult member in one out of every 
two liquidity-constrained participating households started to work off-farm after joining Grain for Green. 
In contrast, although the program had a positive effect on off-farm employment decisions by less 
liquidity-constrained household in the other three quartiles, the estimated coefficients are mostly 
statistically insignificant. Estimates of the coefficients at the individual level are consistent and show 
even stronger results compared to the household-level findings (column 3). The program increased the 
probability of a household member starting an off-farm job by 20 percent for households in the two  
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lowest quartiles, while the effect was statistically insignificant for individuals in the higher two quartiles. 
In contrast, estimates for on-farm work suggest that households and individuals in the lowest-asset 
quartiles moved away from on-farm work (columns 2 and 4). The magnitude of the coefficient gets 
steadily smaller as the level of assets in the quartile categories gets higher (although the increase is not 
linear).   
  We found consistent results when we split the households using Zeldes’ rule into 
liquidity-constrained and -unconstrained groups and compared the DID estimates. The DID estimates for 
the constrained group was positive and statistically significant both at the household and individual 
levels. The DID estimates for the unconstrained group were insignificant.
16   
  In sum, the findings reveal that the less liquidity-constrained a household is prior to the 
program the more positive the impact of the Grain for Green program is on its off-farm employment 
participation. One way of interpreting this result is that participation in Grain for Green relaxes a 
household’s liquidity constraint and that it garners resources the household can use to participate in 
off-farm work. Thus, the more constrained the household, the larger is the program’s impact on off-farm 
work.   
Human Capital 
  We also are interested in understanding how human capital can influence the program’s effects 
among households. Age and education are two fundamental indicators of human capital that affect the 
ability of individuals to find off-farm work. Higher education is expected to result in greater rewards 
from off-farm labor (Becker, 1993). Education here is defined as the number of completed years of  
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schooling and is assumed to capture the skills the individual may bring to a given job in the off-farm 
labor market. Previous studies have also shown that migration (which is included in this study’s off-farm 
labor supply) is influenced inversely by age; older people are less likely to migrate since they have less 
time to pay back the investment (Lanzona, 1998). In the conceptual model, education and age are 
included in z
o, one of the factors that is assumed to help determine the off-farm labor supply. To test 
whether the program’s effect on off-farm labor is influenced by the households’ access to human capital, 
we again divide the sample into quartiles based on an initial level of education and on age cohorts. 
  The results show that levels of human capital, in terms of both age and of education, impact 
how the program affects off-farm labor (Table 8). The estimates imply that adult family members who 
are younger are more likely to shift to the off-farm labor market after the onset of Grain for Green than 
are older ones. For example, for adults in the youngest quartile, the program increased the probability of 
off-farm labor participation by 37 percent; for the oldest quartile, Grain for Green decreased off-farm 
employment by 13 percent (columns 3 and 4). This result is convincing considering that the types of 
off-farm jobs that are first available to rural farmers are physically demanding (jobs such as construction 
work) and naturally favor young adults. 
  Perhaps more importantly, the results show that Grain for Green did not have a positive effect 
on off-farm employment for adults who had only limited education prior to the program (columns 1 and 
2). If the individual was in the lowest quartile for education, participation in the program did not change 
the likelihood of that person gaining an off-farm job, and the likelihood of finding off-farm employment 
increases as educational attainment increases. This result suggests that the program may not be able to  
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induce structural change in income-generating activities if participants do not have adequate education 
for off-farm work. These findings add yet another piece of empirical evidence suggesting that China will 
have to expand its investment in education to achieve its goals. 
In the 2005 survey, we asked participating household members what they would do if the 
government stopped payments after five to eight years (Figure 5). More than 20 percent of the 
respondents wanted to find work off the farm. If they are unable to do so without a certain level of 
education, they are at risk for being trapped in poverty when program compensation ceases. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
  In our study, we consistently find that, on average, the Grain for Green program has a positive 
(although only moderately strong) effect on off-farm labor participation. In other words, households that 
participate in the program are increasingly shifting their labor endowment from on-farm work to the 
off-farm labor market. This shift occurs not only in absolute terms but is statistically significant when 
compared to similar shifts in nonparticipating households. In terms of program intensity, we find that 
program impacts increase as the ratio of a household’s retired plots to total land holdings grows. These 
findings are different from those of previous studies that evaluated Grain for Green. The results also 
indicate that households with less liquid assets are more affected (positively) by the program. This result 
supports the view that the compensation paid by Grain for Green for setting aside cultivated land may 
be relaxing the liquidity constraint for participating households, allowing participants to more readily 
move into the off-farm employment sector (relative to nonparticipants).    
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  The positive impact of conservation payments on off-farm labor in China contrasts with 
findings in the U.S., where studies have typically found that government payments to farmers decrease 
off-farm labor participation. Although we could not directly determine the reasons why this is so, we did 
observe an opposing effect, the sensitivity of the Grain for Green program impact to the level of the 
household’s physical and human capital indicates that there may be more impediments to participating in 
off-farm labor in rural China than there are in the U.S. Therefore, in terms of policy impact for China, if 
policymakers want to achieve a win-win outcome from the Grain for Green program by meeting both 
environmental and development goals, they may need to provide additional support to vulnerable 
populations through job training programs or other means. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 The program was officially implemented in 2000. Pilot projects for the program got under way in 1999 
in selected provinces. The Grain for Green program is also known as the Sloped Land Conversion 
Program. 
2 Most close observers believe, however, that Grain for Green has been “quasi voluntary.” Although 
households officially can choose whether or not to participate, some households with land fitting the 
slope criterion reported being “strongly encouraged” to participate. In fact, Xu et al. (2005) found that 
on 53ly percent of participating households in their sample believed that their participation was not 
mandatory and only 30 percent had the autonomy to choose which plots to retire. If households are 
coerced into an unattractive program, do not have the physical and human capital necessary to switch to 
alternative income-generating activities and are not permitted to return the land to cultivation after the 
program ends, it is possible such households could be trapped in poverty. 
3  Both grain and cash compensations are provided for eight years if ecological forests are planted, for 
five years for planting of economic forests, and for two years for planting of grasses State Forestry 
Administration (2003) Master Plan for the Sloping Land Conversion Program.. To account for the 
difference in regional average yields, annual grain compensation was set at 2,250 kilograms per hectare 
in the Yangtze River basin and 1,500 kilograms per hectare in the Yellow River basin. The cash 
component is 300 yuan per hectare of eligible land per year. 
4  The study by Groom et al. (2006) used a household survey implemented in 2004 and collected 1999 
preprogram data on a recall basis. 
5  Ahearn et al. (2005) argue that the expected impact of government payments on off-farm labor 
participation depends on whether the payment is decoupled (producers are not required to produce 
specific commodities to receive a subsidy) or not. If it is a decoupled payment, it is like nonlabor 
income; a traditional labor-leisure model would predict that an increase in nonlabor income would 
unambiguously decrease off-farm labor. If, however, the payment is coupled to the commodity grown, 
the compensation then is like an increase in wage, which would have an income and a substitution effect  
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that, combined, would have an ambiguous effect on labor.   
6  For an excellent overview of the Grain for Green program, see Xu et al. (2005).   
7  But, due to recent controversies over fiscal pressures, hikes in grain prices, and delivery of program 
compensation, the government scaled back expansion of the program in 2005 and is discussing how to 
reduce the extent of the program overall (Xu, et al., 2006). 
8  The annual average official exchange rate in 2001 was 8.28 Chinese yuan to one U.S. dollar. The 
purchasing-power parity conversion factor in 2001 was 1.9 yuan to the dollar World Bank. World 
Development Indicators. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.. 
9  For example, Xu et al. (2006) found that the value of preprogram production for more than 70 percent 
of participating households was less valuable than the compensation rate. Furthermore, the level of 
compensation is not trivial relative to the earnings of the typical participating household in the study 
region. For example, if an average household in Sichuan Province (Yangtze River basin) received full 
compensation, it would receive 340 yuan per capita, an amount equal to 24 percent of the average 
household’s preprogram total per capita income in 1999 (Uchida et al., 2005). 
10  Because some households could not be included in the 2005 survey, 78 new households were added 
in 2005. We found, however, that the newly sampled households had systematically different household 
characteristics for some variables, such as household size and land holdings. In addition, preprogram 
data for 1999 that was collected in 2005 from these additional households would likely suffer from 
recall bias. Consequently, we excluded these households from our analysis. 
11 Unfortunately, we did not have a variable that distinguished between types of off-farm work in the 
2005 survey, and thus we relied on the binary variable that indicated whether an individual member had 
an off-farm job or not.  For 2002 and 2004, however, we do have information regarding the intensity of 
off-farm work (Table 2). We find that between these two years the average hours worked per day and the 
number of days per year increased for participants but not for nonparticipants. Earnings from off-farm 
work  and  remittances  increased  for  both  groups  but  the  differences  between  the  two  groups  in  a 
particular year are not statistically significant. The survey did not ask for information on labor hours  
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invested before the program (in 1999) out of concern for measurement error. Consequently, we hereafter 
leave behind analysis of the program’s impact on the intensive margin (differences in number of hours 
worked) and focus on the extensive margin (whether there was a shift of a family member from the 
on-farm to the off-farm sector). 
12  While DID allows us to control for unobserved factors, a disadvantage of this type of reduced-form 
approach is that I cannot estimate other interesting parameters such as price elasticities. The main 
objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of the Grain for Green program so I chose to take the 
DID approach. In addition, this method avoids errors in measurement errors of wage and other prices. 
13  The household data set includes household size and total land holdings for 1999 and 2004. Changes 
in these two variables are observed in only a few households in the sample so including changes in those 
variables when estimating DID does not make a significant difference. 
14  The reliability of the DID estimator lies in the identification assumption that there are no omitted 
time-varying effects that are correlated with the program. For example, the identification assumption 
might be violated if other local governmental programs existed that both affected labor allocation and 
were correlated with participation in the Grain for Green program. Unfortunately, I did not have 
information to control for other governmental programs and thus had to interpret all results with this 
caveat in mind. 
15  The term “persons” is loosely used here. The dependent variable is the head count of household 
members with off-farm labor work. Since a household member with any number of hours of off-farm 
work is counted as one person, “persons” cannot be defined by hours or full-time equivalents (FTEs). 
16  The number of participating households that were liquidity-constrained and -unconstrained were 170 
and 55, respectively, and for non-participating households 32 and 8. The DID estimates for liquidity 
-constrained and -unconstrained households were 0.415 (t=1.96) and -0.260 (t=0.70), respectively. At the 
individual level, the estimates were 0.132 (t=2.78) and -0.013 (t=0.14), respectively.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participating and nonparticipating households. 
  Participants (as of 2005)  Nonparticipants 
Samples in Panel Data     
No. of households in sample – 1999  0  270 
No. of households in sample – 2002  201  69 
No. of households in sample – 2004  230  40 
     
No. of individuals in sample – 1999    0  1,010 
No. of individuals in sample – 2002  768  242 
No. of individuals in sample – 2004  935  155 
Program Characteristics – 2004     
Number of years in program (years)  4.5  n.a. 
Program area (mu)  9.3  n.a. 
Ratio of program area to total land 
holdings (%) 
48.7  n.a. 
Household Characteristics – 2002     
Schooling of household head 
(years) 
4.8  4.7 
Age of household head (years)  47  48 
Total land holdings (mu)  13.7  10.0 
Number of household members   
over age 15 (persons) 
3.8  3.6 
Average age of household members 
over age 15 (years) 
39  41 
Average educational attainment of 
household members over   
age 15 (years) 
4.7  4.4 
Asset Holdings per Capita (1999)     
  Livestock assets (yuan)  88  113 
  Consumer durables (yuan)  461  481 
  Fixed productive assets (yuan)  231  147 
  Loans, productive (yuan)  35  25 
  Loans, consumption (yuan)  459  192 
  Bank savings (yuan)  42  14 
  Total asset value (yuan)  1,338  972 
Note: Zero values were included when calculating the means for asset holdings per capita.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of labor allocation for participants and nonparticipants.   
 
  Participants (as of 2005)  Nonparticipants 
  1999  2004  1999  2004 
Percent of individuals with 
off-farm work 
23.9  32.4  28.2  30.8 
Percent of individuals with 
farm work 
69.1  67.4  69.4  76.7 
Household members with 
off-farm work (persons) 
0.72  1.24  0.93  1.15 
Household members 
working on-farm (persons) 
2.59  2.59  2.53  2.90 
         
  2002  2004  2002  2004 
If the individual has 
off-farm work: 
       
  hours per day  9.2  9.6*  9.4  9.0* 
  days per year  171  188  196  164 
  months per year  6.7*  7.0  7.6*  6.3 
  annual earnings (yuan)  3,313*  4,305  4,339*  5,736 
  annual remittances (yuan)  1,936*  2,362  2,812*  3,180 
 
Note: * indicates that the average for participants and nonparticipants for the given year are 
statistically significantly different.  
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Table 3. Impact of Grain for Green on household decisions regarding off-farm labor for 
1999 and 2004.  
 
  Dependent Variable: number of household members with off-farm work 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
treatment x year2004  0.307 
(1.62) 
         
program area x year2004    0.010 
(2.22)** 
       
Ratio of program area to 
total land holdings x 
year2004 
    0.284 
(2.55)** 
     
Number of years in program 
x year2004 
      0.040 
(1.54) 
   
program area x number of 
years in program x year2004 
        0.002 
(2.40)** 
 
Ratio of program area to 
total land x number of years 
in program x year2004 
          0.056 
(2.93)*** 
Yangtze Dummy x year2004  0.121  0.159  0.152  0.115  0.158  0.155 
  (1.17)  (1.51)  (1.47)  (1.13)  (1.51)  (1.51) 
treatment  –0.113  0.020  –0.011  –0.044  0.022  –0.008 
  (0.84)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.40)  (0.23)  (0.08) 
year2004  0.180  0.357  0.317  0.293  0.360  0.317 
  (0.99)  (4.29)***  (3.58)***  (2.35)**  (4.44)***  (3.74)*** 
household size  0.125  0.123  0.126  0.124  0.123  0.125 
  (6.09)***  (6.03)***  (6.18)***  (6.05)***  (5.99)***  (6.14)*** 
total land holdings  –0.001  –0.005  –0.003  –0.002  –0.005  –0.004 
  (0.29)  (1.15)  (0.87)  (0.42)  (1.20)  (0.97) 
household members with 
off-farm work in 1999 
(persons) 
0.589 
(13.62)*** 
0.596 
(13.78)*** 
0.599 
(13.85)*** 
0.588 
(13.61)*** 
0.597 
(13.81)*** 
0.601 
(13.92)*
** 
Constant  –0.192  –0.258  –0.265  –0.240  –0.255  –0.259 
  (1.23)  (1.88)*  (1.96)*  (1.67)*  (1.86)*  (1.92)* 
Observations  534  534  534  534  534  534 
R-square  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.40 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level  
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Table 4. Impact of Grain for Green on household decisions on farm labor for 1999 and 
2004. 
 
 
  Dependent Variable:   
number of household members working on-farm 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
treatment x year2004  –0.430 
(2.10)** 
         
program area x year2004    –0.002 
(0.35) 
       
ratio of program area to total 
land holdings x year2004 
    –0.152 
(1.26) 
     
number of years in program x 
year2004 
      –0.023 
(0.83) 
   
program area x number of 
years in program x year2004 
        –0.001 
(0.69) 
 
ratio of program area to total 
land x number of years in 
program x year2004 
          –0.031 
(1.51) 
treatment  –0.007  –0.216  –0.192  –0.170  –0.214  –0.192 
  (0.05)  (2.06)**  (1.80)*  (1.42)  (2.04)**  (1.82)* 
year 2004 dummy  0.479  0.118  0.173  0.194  0.130  0.176 
  (2.45)**  (1.30)  (1.79)*  (1.43)  (1.47)  (1.90)* 
year 2004 x Yangtze basin  –0.178  –0.163  –0.180  –0.160  –0.170  –0.183 
  (1.60)  (1.42)  (1.59)  (1.44)  (1.50)  (1.63) 
household size  0.090  0.090  0.089  0.091  0.091  0.089 
  (3.73)***  (3.74)***  (3.68)***  (3.75)***  (3.76)***  (3.70)*** 
total land holdings  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002 
  (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.38)  (0.16)  (0.35)  (0.45) 
household members    0.682  0.681  0.681  0.682  0.681  0.682 
Constant  0.384  0.554  0.533  0.518  0.544  0.528 
  (2.24)**  (3.66)***  (3.55)***  (3.27)***  (3.59)***  (3.52)*** 
Observations  534  534  534  534  534  534 
R-square  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
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Table 5. Impact of Grain for Green on individual off-farm labor decisions for 1999 and 
2004. 
 
  Dependent Variable: 1=Off-farm work, 0=No off-farm work 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
treatment x year2004  0.148 
(2.04)** 
         
program area x 
year2004 
  0.002 
(1.48) 
       
ratio of program area to 
total land holdings x 
year2004 
    0.086 
(2.19)** 
     
number of years in 
program x year2004 
      0.010 
(0.98) 
   
program area x number 
of years in program x 
year2004 
        0.000 
(1.52) 
 
ratio of program area to 
total land x number of 
years in program x 
year2004 
          0.015 
(2.32)** 
year 2004    0.066  0.170  0.150  0.152  0.172  0.153 
dummy  (0.98)  (5.39)***  (4.39)***  (3.03)***  (5.62)***  (4.72)*** 
year 2004 x Yangtze 
basin 
0.043  0.049  0.053  0.038  0.049  0.052 
  (1.09)  (1.20)  (1.27)  (0.95)  (1.19)  (1.27) 
household size  0.013  0.012  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.012 
  (1.89)*  (1.70)*  (1.79)*  (1.84)*  (1.68)*  (1.73)* 
total land holdings  –0.001  –0.002  –0.002  –0.001  –0.002  –0.002 
  (0.60)  (1.40)  (1.34)  (0.76)  (1.41)  (1.42) 
individual had off-farm    0.743  0.743  0.745  0.742  0.744  0.745 
work in 1999 (1,0)  (25.03)***  (25.32)***  (25.48)***  (25.11)***  (25.34)***  (25.51)*** 
Observations  1,955  1,955  1,955  1,955  1,955  1,955 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
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Table 6. Impact of Grain for Green on individual farm labor decisions for 1999 and 2004. 
 
  Dependent Variable: 1=Individual work on-farm, 0=does not work on-farm 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
treatment x year2004  –0.125 
(1.55) 
         
program area x year2004    0.001 
(0.51) 
       
ratio of program area to 
total land holdings x 
year2004 
    0.015 
(0.28) 
     
number of years in 
program x year2004 
      –0.007 
(0.49) 
   
program area x number 
of years in program x 
year2004 
        0.000 
(0.19) 
 
ratio of program area to 
total land x number of 
years in program x 
year2004 
          0.001 
(0.06) 
treatment  0.008  –0.058  –0.059  –0.042  –0.057  –0.057 
  (0.34)  (1.63)  (1.65)*  (1.05)  (1.60)  (1.59) 
year 2004 dummy  0.105  –0.013  –0.010  0.024  –0.006  –0.004 
  (1.37)  (0.34)  (0.24)  (0.40)  (0.16)  (0.10) 
year 2004 x    –0.046  –0.031  –0.035  –0.040  –0.036  –0.037 
Yangtze basin  (0.80)  (0.54)  (0.61)  (0.71)  (0.62)  (0.66) 
household size  –0.015  –0.015  –0.015  –0.015  –0.015  –0.015 
  (2.02)**  (2.04)**  (2.02)**  (2.01)**  (2.03)**  (2.03)** 
total land holdings  –0.000  –0.000  –0.000  0.000  –0.000  –0.000 
  (0.04)  (0.34)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.13)  (0.04) 
individual worked    0.728  0.728  0.727  0.727  0.727  0.727 
on farm in 1999  (28.20)***  (28.59)***  (28.63)***  (28.32)***  (28.51)***  (28.56)*** 
Observations  1,957  1,957  1,957  1,957  1,957  1,957 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
Note: The reported coefficients are marginal effects of a probit model. Robust z-statistics are calculated 
based on the clustered standard error at the household level.  
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Table 7. Program impact on off-farm and farm jobs, treatment indicator interacted with 
quartile dummies of asset holdings, 1999 and 2004.  
 
  Household  Individual 
  (1) off-farm  (2) farm  (3) off-farm  (4) farm 
poorest in asset value in 1999    0.515  –0.431  0.198  –0.164 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (2.54)**  (1.93)*  (2.49)**  (1.97)** 
second poorest in asset value in 1999    0.331  –0.341  0.197  –0.082 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (1.64)  (1.54)  (2.49)**  (1.03) 
second richest in asset value in 1999    0.197  –0.521  0.115  –0.115 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (0.96)  (2.32)**  (1.50)  (1.39) 
Richest in asset value in 1999    0.091  –0.399  0.105  –0.161 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (0.45)  (1.79)*  (1.39)  (1.93)* 
treatment  –0.107  –0.003  –0.041  0.012 
  (0.82)  (0.02)  (0.78)  (0.23) 
year 2004 dummy  0.163  0.492  0.062  0.106 
  (0.93)  (2.55)**  (1.04)  (1.62) 
year 2004 * Yangtze basin  0.156  –0.205  0.052  –0.048 
  (1.55)  (1.86)*  (1.66)*  (1.32) 
household size  0.109  0.097  0.011  –0.013 
  (5.34)***  (4.03)***  (1.77)*  (2.03)** 
total land holdings  –0.000  –0.000  –0.000  –0.000 
  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.39)  (0.40) 
household members with off-farm  0.608    0.746   
work in 1999  (14.36)***    (25.89)***   
household members working on-farm      0.687    0.730 
in 1999    (20.84)***    (29.00)*** 
Constant  –0.142  0.343     
  (0.93)  (2.01)**     
Observations  528  528  1,928  1,930 
R-square  0.41  0.56     
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses in models (1) and (2); z-statistics in (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
Notes: In models (1) and (2), the dependent variables are the number of household members with (1) 
off-farm work or (2) farm work. In models (3) and (4), the dependent variables are 1 = individual has (3) 
off-farm work or (4) farm work and 0 = not. Columns (3) and (4) report the marginal effects of a probit 
model and the standard errors are clustered at the household level.  
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Table 8. Program impact on off-farm and farm jobs, treatment indicator interacted with 
quartile dummies of education and age, 1999 and 2004. 
 
  Education  Age 
  (1) off-farm  (2) farm  (3) off-farm  (4) farm 
least education (dummy) x    0.026  –0.170     
treatment x year2004  (0.36)  (2.08)**     
second least education (dummy)    0.147  –0.085     
x treatment x year2004  (2.00)**  (1.09)     
second most education    0.235  –0.117     
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (3.03)***  (1.48)     
most education (dummy) x    0.216  –0.061     
treatment x year2004  (2.54)**  (0.71)     
youngest age group (dummy) x        0.374  –0.095 
treatment x year2004      (4.46)***  (1.20) 
second youngest age group        0.189  –0.096 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004      (2.46)**  (1.19) 
second oldest age group        0.153  –0.082 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004      (2.01)**  (0.99) 
oldest age group (dummy) x        –0.134  –0.266 
treatment x year2004      (2.32)**  (3.03)*** 
age in 2002  –0.006  –0.000     
  (7.40)***  (0.01)     
education in 2002      0.013  –0.006 
      (4.22)***  (1.92)* 
treatment  –0.044  0.002  –0.037  0.012 
  (0.88)  (0.04)  (0.74)  (0.22) 
year 2004 dummy  0.050  0.096  0.032  0.107 
  (0.88)  (1.50)  (0.57)  (1.64) 
year 2004 * Yangtze basin  0.062  –0.052  0.092  –0.049 
  (1.96)**  (1.44)  (2.78)***  (1.36) 
household size  0.010  –0.012  0.012  –0.011 
  (1.70)*  (1.85)*  (2.00)**  (1.75)* 
total land holdings  –0.001  –0.000  –0.001  –0.000 
  (0.89)  (0.22)  (0.87)  (0.32) 
individual had (1)(2) off-farm work    0.733  0.733  0.736  0.723 
(3)(4) on-farm work in 1999 (1,0)  (24.87)***  (28.13)***  (24.66)***  (27.11)*** 
Observations  1,928  1,930  1,924  1,926 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.   
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent; *** at 1 percent level 
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Notes: n = 230. Households started retiring cultivated land at the end of the harvest season, so 
those who said that they participated in 1999 actually retired the land for 2000.   
 
Data: Author’s survey, 2003 and 2005. 
 
Figure 1. Number of participating households by starting year.   
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  Notes: Only includes participating households. Some households retired    noncultivated 
land so the ratio can exceed one. 
  Data: Author’s survey, 2005.   
 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of ratio of accumulated Grain for Green program area to total 
household land holdings.  
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Notes: n = 325 responses from 266 program participants (multiple choices). Responses to the 
question “What do you do with the freed-up on-farm labor time after participating in the Grain 
for Green program?” 
 
Data source: Author’s survey, 2005.   
 
Figure 3. Time reallocation choices after participating in the Grain for Green program. 
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Panel B 
  Notes: n = 270.   
  Data: Author’s survey, 2003 and 2005. 
Figure 4. Proportion of individuals who engaged in off-farm activities (Panel A) and 
farm activities (Panel B) for participants and nonparticipants in Grain for Green. 
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Note: n = 337 responses from 266 program participants (multiple choices). 
Responses to the question “If the government stops compensation after 5 to 8 years, 
what would you most likely do?” 
Data source: Author’s survey, 2005. 
 
Figure 5. What participants are likely to do if the government stops compensation in the 
future. 
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Appendix 1. Household model with liquidity, labor, land and full income 
constraints and derivation of its first-order conditions. 
We consider a farm household that maximizes utility, which is defined by consumption of 
leisure  ( )
f L   and a composite consumption good  ( ) C   and is conditional on household 
characteristics that define consumption preferences  ( )
c z . The household derives income by 
working off-farm in a wage-earning activity, producing agricultural goods on-farm and 
receiving compensation for participating in the conservation set-aside. Each household is 
endowed with a fixed amount of time,  ( ) L , that it can allocate to on-farm activity  ( )
f L , 
off-farm work  ( )
O L , or leisure  ( )
l L . For work off the farm, the household incurs variable 
transaction costs, 
vo t   (e.g., transportation costs), and fixed transaction costs, 
O t   (e.g., 
job-search costs or start-up costs for a family-owned business). Participation in off-farm 
employment is a function of the individual’s human capital, 
o z , which includes 
characteristics such as level of education. 
  The household also is endowed with a total holding of land,  A. The household can 
allocate land to the conservation set-aside program  ( )
gfg A   or to production of agricultural 
goods  ( )
f A . We assume that land rental markets function poorly, which is consistent with the 
environment in the areas of rural China in which Grain for Green has been implemented. 
Therefore, there is a constraint on land available to the household: 
f gfg A A A £ - . When the 
government compensation rate for conservation set-aside is designated by  d , the income 
from participating in the program is 
gfg A d .  
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  Production of the agricultural good is assumed to be a quasi-concave technology: 
( ) , , ;
f f f f L n A z   where  n  represents a composite variable for nonlabor input and 
f z  
captures other production conditions such as soil quality. We assume that the land and labor 
required to produce the agricultural good on-farm are complements; in other words, 
0 lim
L f L
® ¶ ¶ = ¥ , 
0
lim
f A
f A
®
¶ ¶ = ¥  and  . Other types of income (e.g., investment 
income, remittances and pensions) are acquired outside of the labor market and do not require 
land. We designate the set of these resources by R.   
  Finally, the household is endowed with a set amount of liquidity,  K. Households 
may have to seek credit to finance farm production or to work off-farm. If a household 
chooses to borrow an amount B, it incurs a fixed transaction cost of 
B t . The transaction cost 
to borrow money represents time and monetary costs of the loan application and disbursement. 
The interest rate for the loan is exogenously set and, for simplicity, is set equal to zero in the 
model. 
  The decision of the farmer household is expressed as 
, , ,
( , ; )
f o gfg
l c
L L A n
Max U L C z  
  subject to 
( )
vo o o f gfg L z nA K B A t w d + £ + +     (3) 
f O l L L L L + + =       (4) 
f gfg A A A = -       (5)  
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    (6) 
, , , 0
o gfg L B n A ³ .        (7) 
Equation (3) states that expenditures on nonlabor input,  n, for farm production plus 
(variable) transaction costs incurred if household members work off-farm or borrow are 
limited to the sum of the value of the household’s liquidity, which is the sum of liquidity asset, 
amount borrowed and compensation from land retirement. Equation (4) states that the 
household’s time endowment is divided among working on-farm, working off-farm and 
leisure. Equation (5) limits the amount of cultivated land that can be used for agricultural 
production and for conservation to the household’s land endowment. Equation (6) is a full 
income constraint that limits consumption to income from off-farm labor, profits from 
production of agricultural commodities, compensation from the set-aside program and 
liquidity asset minus fixed transaction costs associated with participation in off-farm labor 
and/or credit markets. 
The first-order necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to on-farm 
and off-farm labor (after rearranging the terms) can be written as 
    (8) 
According to equation (8), at the optimum the household allocates time to on-farm and 
off-farm labor so that the marginal value product of farm labor multiplied by marginal utility  
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of consumption is equal to the effective wage, which is the market wage minus the variable 
transaction costs, multiplied by marginal utility of consumption, minus the shadow value of 
liquidity times the variable transaction costs of off-farm labor. The utility-maximizing 
household modeled here will allocate less time to off-farm labor as liquidity is more 
constrained, ceteris paribus. In other words, if an agent’s liquidity constraint is relaxed 
through program payments, then an agent allocates more time to off-farm labor and less to 
on-farm labor (hypothesis 1). It also implies that the more liquidity-constrained the farmer is 
prior to the program, the larger the effect of program payments on off-farm labor (hypothesis 
2)   
  Using Implicit Function Theorem, we can also derive that higher compensation rate 
increases off-farm labor    if the marginal product of on-farm labor is larger than 
the effective wage , and vice versa. Testing this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, 
although previous studies of the Grain for Green program have found that the compensation 
rate typically is larger than the value of the crop yielded by the retired plots (i.e., the 
opportunity cost of program participation) (Xu et al., 2006; Uchida et al., 2004). For example, 
Xu et al. (2006) found that the value of preprogram production for more than 70 percent of 
participating households was less valuable than the compensation rate. Furthermore, the level 
of compensation is not trivial relative to the earnings of the typical participating household in 
the study region. For example, if an average household in Sichuan Province (Yangtze River  
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basin) received full compensation, it would receive 340 yuan per capita, an amount equal to 
24 percent of the average household’s preprogram total per capita income in 1999 (Uchida, et 
al., 2005). 
The first-order conditions also imply that households that have limited liquidity and 
cannot borrow will allocate more labor to farm production: 
    (9) 
In other words, at the optimum, the household allocates land so that opportunity cost of 
retiring the last unit of land (which is the marginal-value product of land from agricultural 
production) equals the shadow value of compensation rate of the conservation set-aside 
program. This constraint implies that the higher the shadow value of liquidity, the more the 
household will allocate land to farming, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, there is one more implication of the model. If the land rental market does not 
exist (as has been shown to generally be the case in rural China) and the household’s liquidity 
constraint is binding (which we assume is true in some households, especially for people who 
live in poor, mountainous areas), then we expect that the program’s off-farm labor impact 
should be affected by consumption-side characteristics in addition to production-side 
characteristics. This relationship can be stated as 
( )
* ; , , , , , , , , , , , ,
gfg vo o B c f
o L f A p w K B A L z z w d t t t = .
1 
                                                 
1  If only the land rental market is missing and the liquidity constraint is not binding (i.e.,  0
B l = ), the model 
becomes recursive and decisions on production and consumption are separable. In that case, the reduced form of  
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the off-farm labor supply is given by  ( )
* ; , , , , , , , , , ,
gfg vo o f
o L f A p w K B A L z w d t t = . 
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1. Impact of Grain for Green on household and individual members’ 
off-farm labor participation for participating households that changed status from 
nonparticipating to participating between 2002 and 2004. 
  Off-farm  Farm 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Household  Individual  Household  Individual 
treatment x year2004  0.534  0.318  –0.280  –0.039 
  (2.05)**  (2.91)***  (1.05)  (0.32) 
treatment  –0.142  –0.045  –0.045  –0.011 
  (0.76)  (1.30)  (0.24)  (0.35) 
year 2004 dummy  0.065  0.023  0.497  0.123 
  (0.33)  (0.29)  (2.51)**  (1.31) 
year 2004 * Yangtze basin  0.422  0.171  –0.300  –0.120 
  (2.27)**  (2.17)**  (1.58)  (1.05) 
household size  0.129  0.018  0.168  0.021 
  (2.47)**  (1.00)  (3.03)***  (0.99) 
total land holdings  –0.003  0.001  0.007  0.006 
  (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.92)  (2.72)*** 
household members with    0.503  0.759     
off-farm work in 1999  (5.70)***  (12.55)***     
household members with farm        0.736  0.735 
work in 1999      (10.97)***  (14.25)*** 
Constant  –0.124    –0.176   
  (0.44)    (0.59)   
Observations  132  459  132  459 
R-square  0.36    0.60   
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
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Appendix Table 2. Program impact on off-farm and farm jobs, treatment indicator 
interacted with quartile dummies of asset holdings using participating households that 
changed status from nonparticipating to participating between 2002 and 2004. 
  Household  Individual 
  (1) off-farm  (2) farm  (3) off-farm  (4) farm 
poorest in asset value in 1999    0.681  –0.155  0.358  –0.117 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (2.18)**  (0.48)  (2.54)**  (0.99) 
second poorest in asset value in    1.244  –0.273  0.479  0.040 
1999 (dummy) x treatment x year2004  (3.22)***  (0.68)  (2.92)***  (0.29) 
second richest in asset value in    –0.020  0.041  0.275   
1999 (dummy) x treatment x year2004  (0.06)  (0.11)  (1.69)*   
richest in asset value in 1999  0.096  –0.425  0.065  –0.191 
(dummy) x treatment x year2004  (0.27)  (1.17)  (0.43)  (1.35) 
treatment  –0.126  –0.055  –0.041  0.022 
  (0.69)  (0.29)  (0.51)  (0.38) 
year 2004 dummy  0.057  0.503  0.021  0.161 
  (0.30)  (2.56)**  (0.30)  (2.76)*** 
year 2004 * Yangtze basin  0.438  –0.311  0.177  –0.143 
  (2.39)**  (1.63)  (2.62)***  (2.03)** 
household size  0.121  0.158  0.019  0.017 
  (2.40)**  (2.88)***  (0.92)  (0.96) 
total land holdings  –0.001  0.009  0.001  0.008 
  (0.10)  (1.20)  (0.37)  (2.47)** 
household members with off-farm  0.547    0.767   
work in 1999  (6.34)***    (12.88)***   
household members working      0.755    0.753 
on-farm in 1999    (11.05)***    (13.93)*** 
Constant  –0.144  –0.198     
  (0.53)  (0.68)     
Observations  130  130  453  453 
R-square  0.41  0.62     
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses in (1) and (2); z-statistics in (3) and (4). 
* significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level 
 
 
 
 